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A Full Characterization of Nash Implementation with Strategy Space Reduction

  • Lombardi, Michele
  • Yoshihara, Naoki

Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and Maskin’s theorem (Maskin, 1999) is shown using a mechanism with Saijo’s type of strategy space reduction (Saijo, 1988), this paper fully characterizes the class of Nashimplementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) by mechanisms endowed with Saijo’s message space specification - s-mechanisms. This class of SCCs is further shown to be equivalent to the class of Nashimplementable SCCs, though any further ‘strategy space reduction’ mechanism breaks this equivalent relationship down.

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File URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/19096/1/DP548.pdf
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Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number a548.

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Length: 21 p.
Date of creation: Apr 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:a548
Note: January 18, 2011
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