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A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction

Listed author(s):
  • Michele Lombardi

    ()

  • Naoki Yoshihara

    ()

The paper fully characterizes the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) by mechanisms endowed with Saijo’s message space specification— $$s$$ -mechanisms. This class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of Nash implementable SCCs, though any game form involving ‘one less’ preference announcements breaks this equivalence relationship down. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-012-0714-2
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Article provided by Springer & Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 54 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 131-151

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:54:y:2013:i:1:p:131-151
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0714-2
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Web page: http://saet.uiowa.edu/

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Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/199/PS2

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