Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms
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- Matthew, Jackson O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay., 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanism," Working Papers 754, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 966, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
References listed on IDEAS
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