Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem
The main result of this paper is that the multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design can be avoided in private-value models if agents do not use weakly-dominated strategies in equilibrium. The authors show that, in such settings, any incentive-compatible allocation rule can be made the unique equilibrium outcome to a mechanism. They derive a general necessary condition for unique implementation that implies that the positive result for private-value models applies with considerably less generality to common-value settings. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.
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