Implementation via Nash Equilibria
This paper is concerned with a problem of implementation of a given social choice correspondence. The authors introduces an essential monotonicity condition and show that any implementable social choice correspondence satisfies this condition. Conversely, in a case of three or more participants, any essentially monotone social choice correspondence is implementable. In a case of two participants, the essential monotonicity condition must be completed by a requirement that the social choice correspondence is close to an individually rational correspondence. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.
Volume (Year): 60 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: 1 212 998 3820|
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: https://www.econometricsociety.org/publications/econometrica/access/ordering-back-issues Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:60:y:1992:i:1:p:43-56. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.