Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
This paper studies the problem of implementation of allocation rules in economic environments when agents are incompletely informed about the environment. The concept of equilibrium used is that of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The authors show that a condition called Bayesian monotonicity is necessary for implementation, as is an incentive compatibility condition. They also show that, when there are at least three agents, Bayesian monotonicity and a slightly stronger incentive compatibility condition are jointly sufficient for implementation. They present several examples to illustrate the result. Copyright 1989 by The Econometric Society.
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Volume (Year): 57 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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