Implementation in Undominated Strategies - A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
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- Matthew O. Jackson, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 757-775.
References listed on IDEAS
- Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1986. "Private information in large economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 34-58, June.
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