Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games: Applications
This paper studies the properties of endogenous information structures in some classes of Bayesian games in which a first stage of strategic information revelation is added. Sufficient conditions for the existence of perfectly revealing or non-revealing equilibria are characterized. In particular, the existence of a perfectly revealing equilibrium is demonstrated for linear Bayesian games with an ordered information structure. Those games include, for example, Cournot games with incomplete information about the cost or the demand of industry, when firms may face any level of higher-order uncertainty. Several examples and different economic applications are examined to illustrate other results presented in the paper.
|Date of creation:||2002|
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- Hans Carlsson & Eric van Damme, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001088, David K. Levine.
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- Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1993. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Other publications TiSEM 49a54f00-dcec-4fc1-9488-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1986. "Private information in large economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 34-58, June.
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- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-391, June.
- Frédéric KOESSLER, 2002. "Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games: A General Model," Working Papers of BETA 2002-01, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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