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Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies

  • Palfrey, Thomas R
  • Srivastava, Sanjay
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    The authors study the problem of implementing social choice correspondences via Nash equilibrium in which no one uses a weakly dominated strategy. The main result is that if there are at least three agents in society, then any correspondence that satisfies no veto power is implementable unless some agents are completely indifferent over all possible outcomes. Many common welfare criteria, such as the Pareto correspondence, and several familiar voting rules satisfy the authors' conditions. This possibility result stands in sharp contrast to the more restrictive findings with implementation in either Nash equilibrium or subgame perfect equilibrium Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.

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    Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

    Volume (Year): 59 (1991)
    Issue (Month): 2 (March)
    Pages: 479-501

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    Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:59:y:1991:i:2:p:479-501
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