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Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium

  • Mezzetti, Claudio
  • Renou, Ludovic

A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any preference profile, the set of all (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives for all cardinal representations of the preference profile. Unlike Maskinʼs definition, our definition does not require each optimal alternative to be the outcome of a pure equilibrium. We show that set-monotonicity, a weakening of Maskinʼs monotonicity, is necessary for mixed Nash implementation. With at least three players, set-monotonicity and no-veto power are sufficient. Important correspondences that are not Maskin monotonic can be implemented in mixed Nash equilibrium.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002205311200097X
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 147 (2012)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 2357-2375

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:6:p:2357-2375
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  12. BOCHET, Olivier & MANIQUET, François, 2006. "Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support," CORE Discussion Papers 2006084, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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