Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
We consider social choice rules which select a lottery over outcomes for each progile of individual preferences. Agents are assumed to have preferences over lotteries satisfying the axioms of expected utility. We exhibit a large class of rules satisfying strategy- proofness.
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