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Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules

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  • Pattanaik, Prasanta K
  • Peleg, Bezalel

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  • Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Peleg, Bezalel, 1986. "Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 909-921, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:54:y:1986:i:4:p:909-21
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nandeibam, Shasikanta, 2000. "Distribution of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 63-84, July.
    2. Regenwetter, Michel & Grofman, Bernard & Marley, A. A. J., 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 451-466, July.
    3. Sprumont, Yves, 0. "Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    4. Indraneel Dasgupta, 2011. "Contraction consistent stochastic choice correspondence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(4), pages 643-658, October.
    5. Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 828.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    6. Indraneel Dasgupta & Prasanta Pattanaik, 2007. "‘Regular’ choice and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(1), pages 35-50, April.
    7. Eraslan, H.Hulya & McLennan, Andrew, 2004. "Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 29-54, July.
    8. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2009. "Fully sincere voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 720-735, November.
    9. Barbera, Salvador & Bogomolnaia, Anna & van der Stel, Hans, 1998. "Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 89-103, March.
    10. Shasikanta Nandeibam, 1994. "Coalitional Power Structure In Stochastic Social Choice Functions With An Unrestricted Preference Domain," Working papers 12, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    11. Kim, Semin, 2017. "Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: A mechanism design approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 350-371.
    12. Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 408-434, August.
    13. Shasikanta Nandeibam, 2009. "On probabilistic rationalizability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 425-437, March.
    14. Munnich, Akos & Maksa, Gyula & J. Mokken, Robert, 1999. "Collective judgement: combining individual value judgements," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 211-233, May.
    15. Shasikanta Nandeibam, 2008. "A note on the structure of stochastic social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 447-455, April.
    16. Chambers, Christopher P., 2009. "An axiomatic theory of political representation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 375-389, January.

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