On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data
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Cited by:
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2020. "Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation," Post-Print hal-02424936, HAL.
- Adrian Deemen, 2014. "On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 311-330, March.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2019.
"Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation,"
Working Papers
hal-02424936, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2020. "Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation," Post-Print hal-02424936, HAL.
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