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On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data

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  • Regenwetter, Michel
  • Grofman, Bernard
  • Marley, A. A. J.

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  • Regenwetter, Michel & Grofman, Bernard & Marley, A. A. J., 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 451-466, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:43:y:2002:i:3:p:451-466
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gehrlein, William V., 1992. "Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 61-66, September.
    2. Donald G. Saari, 2001. "Analyzing a nail-biting election," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 415-430.
    3. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 1999. "Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(3), pages 471-490.
    4. Lepelley, Dominique & Gehrlein, William V., 2000. "Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 157-164, August.
    5. Michel Regenwetter & Bernard Grofman, 1998. "Approval Voting, Borda Winners, and Condorcet Winners: Evidence from Seven Elections," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(4), pages 520-533, April.
    6. Fabrice Valognes & William V. Gehrlein, 2001. "Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 193-205.
    7. Brams, Steven J & Nagel, Jack H, 1991. "Approval Voting in Practice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 71(1-2), pages 1-17, August.
    8. Bernard Grofman & Michel Regenwetter, 1998. "Choosing subsets: a size-independent probabilistic model and the quest for a social welfare ordering," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 423-443.
    9. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 1998. "The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 271-283, April.
    10. Tataru, Maria & Merlin, Vincent, 1997. "On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 81-90, August.
    11. William V. Gehrlein, 1998. "The sensitivity of weight selection on the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 351-358.
    12. Tabarrok, Alexander, 2001. "President Perot or Fundamentals of Voting Theory Illustrated with the 1992 Election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(3-4), pages 275-297, March.
    13. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2001. "A nail-biting election," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 409-414.
    14. Regenwetter, Michel & Marley, A. A. J. & Grofman, Bernard, 2002. "A general concept of majority rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 405-428, July.
    15. A. S. Tangian, 2000. "Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(2), pages 337-365.
    16. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 2001. "The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 39-50, January.
    17. Saari, Donald G., 1999. "Explaining All Three-Alternative Voting Outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 313-355, August.
    18. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Jacob Paroush, 2000. "A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(2), pages 189-199.
    19. Amartya Sen, 1999. "The Possibility of Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 349-378, June.
    20. Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Peleg, Bezalel, 1986. "Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 909-921, July.
    21. Gehrlein, William V., 1998. "The probability of a Condorcet winner with a small number of voters," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 317-321, June.
    22. Regenwetter, Michel, 1997. "Probabilistic preferences and topset voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 91-105, October.
    23. DeMeyer, Frank & Plott, Charles R, 1970. "The Probability of a Cyclical Majority," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(2), pages 345-354, March.
    24. Donald G. Saari & Maria M. Tataru, 1999. "The likelihood of dubious election outcomes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(2), pages 345-363.
    25. Michel Regenwetter & James Adams & Bernard Grofman, 2002. "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 153-186, September.
    26. James Wiseman, 2000. "Approval voting in subset elections," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 15(2), pages 477-483.
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    Cited by:

    1. Adrian Deemen, 2014. "On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 311-330, March.

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