On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
No abstract is available for this item.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gehrlein, William V. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 38-49, October.
- Van Newenhizen, Jill, 1992. "The Borda Method Is Most Likely to Respect the Condorcet Principle," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 69-83, January.
- Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-41, November.
- Williams Gehrlein, 1993. "Condorcet efficiency of two stage constant scoring rules," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 95-101, February.
- Sven Berg, 1985. "Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 377-387, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:34:y:1997:i:1:p:81-90. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.