On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
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References listed on IDEAS
- Van Newenhizen, Jill, 1992. "The Borda Method Is Most Likely to Respect the Condorcet Principle," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(1), pages 69-83, January.
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- Sven Berg, 1985. "Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 377-387, January.
- Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
- Williams Gehrlein, 1993. "Condorcet efficiency of two stage constant scoring rules," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 95-101, February.
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- Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin, 2010. "On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 289-316, August.
- Hervé Crès, 2001. "Aggregation of coarse preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 507-525.
- Kamwa, Eric & Merlin, Vincent, 2015.
"Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 130-138.
- Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2014. "Scoring Rules over Subsets of Alternatives: Consistency and Paradoxes," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201412, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2015. "Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes," Post-Print halshs-01238563, HAL.
- Regenwetter, Michel & Grofman, Bernard & Marley, A. A. J., 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 451-466, July.
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- Mostapha Diss & William Gehrlein, 2012. "Borda’s Paradox with weighted scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(1), pages 121-136, January.
- Hervé Crès, 2000. "Aggregation of Coarse Preferences," Working Papers hal-01064879, HAL.
- Merlin, Vincent & Valognes, Fabrice, 2004.
"The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes,"
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- Vincent Merlin & Fabrice Valognes, 2004. "The Impact of Indifferent Voters on the Likelihood of some Voting Paradoxes," Post-Print halshs-00069089, HAL.
- Martin, Mathieu & Merlin, Vincent, 2002.
"The stability set as a social choice correspondence,"
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- Mathieu Martin & Vincent Merlin, 2002. "The stability set as a social choice correspondence," Post-Print halshs-00069520, HAL.
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- Hervé Crès, 2000. "Aggregation of Coarse Preferences," Sciences Po publications 659/1998, Sciences Po.
- Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 1998. "The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 271-283, April.
- Merlin, V. & Tataru, M. & Valognes, F., 2000. "On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 183-207, March.
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