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On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner

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  • Merlin, V.
  • Tataru, M.
  • Valognes, F.

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  • Merlin, V. & Tataru, M. & Valognes, F., 2000. "On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 183-207, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:33:y:2000:i:2:p:183-207
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tataru, Maria & Merlin, Vincent, 1997. "On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 81-90, August.
    2. Gehrlein, William V. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 38-49, October.
    3. Dominique Lepelley, 1996. "Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(3), pages 491-500.
    4. William V. Gehrlein, 1998. "The sensitivity of weight selection on the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 351-358.
    5. Van Newenhizen, Jill, 1992. "The Borda Method Is Most Likely to Respect the Condorcet Principle," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(1), pages 69-83, January.
    6. Donald G. Saari, 1997. "Explaining Positional Voting Paradoxes: The Simple Case," Discussion Papers 1179, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Sven Berg, 1985. "Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 377-387, January.
    8. William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn, 1983. "Scoring rule sensitivity to weight selection," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 249-261, January.
    9. Kramer, Gerald H., 1977. "A dynamical model of political equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 310-334, December.
    10. William Gehrlein, 1999. "On the Probability that all Weighted Scoring Rules Elect the Condorcet Winner," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 77-84, February.
    11. Donald G. Saari & Maria M. Tataru, 1999. "The likelihood of dubious election outcomes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(2), pages 345-363.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2018. "The Likelihood of the Consistency of Collective Rankings under Preferences Aggregation with Four Alternatives using Scoring Rules: A General Formula and the Optimal Decision Rule," Post-Print hal-01757742, HAL.
    2. Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin, 2010. "On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 289-316, August.
    3. William Gehrlein, 1999. "On the Probability that all Weighted Scoring Rules Elect the Condorcet Winner," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 77-84, February.
    4. Aaron Meyers & Michael Orrison & Jennifer Townsend & Sarah Wolff & Angela Wu, 2014. "Generalized Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 11-27, June.
    5. Kamwa, Eric & Merlin, Vincent, 2015. "Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 130-138.
    6. repec:spr:grdene:v:15:y:2006:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-005-9007-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:spr:grdene:v:24:y:2015:i:5:d:10.1007_s10726-014-9412-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 2000. "The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 191-197, February.
    9. Truchon, Michel, 2004. "Aggregation of Rankings in Figure Skating," Cahiers de recherche 0402, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
    10. Merlin, Vincent & Valognes, Fabrice, 2004. "The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 343-361, November.
    11. William Gehrlein, 2006. "The sensitivity of weight selection for scoring rules to profile proximity to single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 191-208, January.
    12. Chatterjee, Swarnendu & Storcken, Ton, 2017. "Frequency Based Analysis of Voting Rules," Research Memorandum 006, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    13. Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2018. "The Likelihood of the Consistency of Collective Rankings under Preferences Aggregation with Four Alternatives using Scoring Rules: A General Formula and the Optimal Decision Rule," Working Papers hal-01757742, HAL.
    14. Wilson, Mark C. & Pritchard, Geoffrey, 2007. "Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 244-256, December.
    15. repec:eee:matsoc:v:87:y:2017:i:c:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS

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