# Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis

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## Abstract

## Suggested Citation

**Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis**," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 244-256, December.

*RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:54:y:2007:i:3:p:244-256*

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## References listed on IDEAS

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**The probability of conflicts in a U.S. presidential type election**," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 23(2), pages 227-257, January.- Vincent Merlin & Jean-Lous Rouet & Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley, 2004.
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**The Probability of Conflicts in a US Presidential Type Election**," Post-Print halshs-00070893, HAL.

- Vincent Merlin & Jean-Lous Rouet & Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley, 2004.
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**Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic**," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 503-512. - Lepelley, Dominique & Mbih, Boniface, 1987.
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**The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule**," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 311-315. - Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2008.
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**On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory**," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 363-383, April.- Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2006.
"
**On Ehrhart Polynomials and Probability Calculations in Voting Theory**," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 200610, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS. - Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2007.
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**On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory**," Post-Print hal-01245310, HAL.

- Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2006.
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**Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates**," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 61-66, September. - Lepelley, Dominique, 1993.
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**On the probability of electing the Condorcet**," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 105-116, February. - Gehrlein, William V., 1982.
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**Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules**," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 123-130, March. - Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2006.
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**Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules**," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 485-509, June.- Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2006.
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**Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules**," Post-Print halshs-00068839, HAL.

- Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2006.
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- Davide Cervone & William Gehrlein & William Zwicker, 2005.
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**Which Scoring Rule Maximizes Condorcet Efficiency Under Iac?**," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 145-185, March. - Merlin, V. & Tataru, M. & Valognes, F., 2000.
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**On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner**," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 183-207, March. - Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin, 2001.
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**Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates**," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 17(1), pages 53-80.

**Full references**(including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

## Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
**Cited by:**

- Hatem Smaoui & Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou, 2016.
"
**Borda elimination rule and monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections**," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(3), pages 1722-1728.- Hatem Smaoui & Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou, 2016.
"
**Borda elimination rule and monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections**," Post-Print hal-01452550, HAL.

- Hatem Smaoui & Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou, 2016.
"
- Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Smaoui, Hatem, 2012.
"
**The Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote: From IC to IAC trhough Ehrhart's Polynomials and Strong Mixing**," IDEI Working Papers 722, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.- Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Smaoui, Hatem, 2012.
"
**The Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote: From IC to IAC trhough Ehrhart's Polynomials and Strong Mixing**," TSE Working Papers 12-313, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2014.

- Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Smaoui, Hatem, 2012.
"
- Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique & Moyouwou, Issofa, 2016.
"
**A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser**," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 115-122.- William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou, 2016.
"
**A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser**," Post-Print hal-01452548, HAL.

- William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou, 2016.
"
- Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2016.
"
**Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes**," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(3), pages 473-494, March.- Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2015.
"
**Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes**," Working Papers 1533, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon. - Mostapha Diss, 2016.
"
**Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes**," Post-Print halshs-01196091, HAL.

- Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2015.
"
- Le Breton, Michel & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2014.
"
**Influence Vs. Utility in the Evaluation of Voting Rules: A New Look at the Penrose Formula**," TSE Working Papers 14-511, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE). - Pritchard, Geoffrey & Wilson, Mark C., 2009.
"
**Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour**," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 35-57, July. - Diss, Mostapha & Louichi, Ahmed & Merlin, Vincent & Smaoui, Hatem, 2012.
"
**An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: The stability of scoring rules**," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 57-66.- Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Louichi & Vincent Merlin & H. Smaoui, 2012.
"
**An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: The stability of scoring rules**," Post-Print halshs-00667660, HAL.

- Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Louichi & Vincent Merlin & H. Smaoui, 2012.
"
- Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Smaoui, Hatem, 2016.
"
**Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule**," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 11-22.- Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Smaoui, Hatem, 2016.
"
**Correlation, Partitioning and the Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote under the Majority Rule**," TSE Working Papers 16-622, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE). - Michel Le Breton & Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui, 2016.
"
**Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule**," Post-Print hal-01452554, HAL.

- Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Smaoui, Hatem, 2016.
"
- Lepelley, Dominique & Merlin, Vincent & Rouet, Jean-Louis, 2011.
"
**Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox**," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 28-33, July.- Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet, 2011.
"
**Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox**," Post-Print halshs-00602133, HAL.

- Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet, 2011.
"
- William Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2010.
"
**On the probability of observing Borda’s paradox**," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(1), pages 1-23, June.- William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2009.
"
**On the probability of observing Borda’s paradox**," Post-Print hal-01243471, HAL.

- William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2009.
"
- Gehrlein, William V. & Moyouwou, Issofa & Lepelley, Dominique, 2013.
"
**The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes**," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 352-365.- William V. Gehrlein & Issofa Moyouwou & Dominique Lepelley, 2013.
"
**The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes**," Post-Print hal-01243417, HAL.

- William V. Gehrlein & Issofa Moyouwou & Dominique Lepelley, 2013.
"
- Mostapha Diss, 2015.
"
**Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules**," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 229(1), pages 347-376, June.- Mostapha Diss, 2013.
"
**Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules**," Working Papers halshs-00785366, HAL. - Mostapha Diss, 2013.
"
**Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules**," Working Papers 1302, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon. - Mostapha Diss, 2015.
"
**Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules**," Post-Print halshs-01136401, HAL.

- Mostapha Diss, 2013.
"
- repec:spr:grdene:v:24:y:2015:i:2:d:10.1007_s10726-014-9388-4 is not listed on IDEAS
- William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2015.
"
**The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules**," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 243-269, March.- William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2014.
"
**The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules**," Post-Print hal-01450834, HAL.

- William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2014.
"
- repec:eee:matsoc:v:89:y:2017:i:c:p:70-82 is not listed on IDEAS
- Boniface Mbih & Issofa Moyouwou & Xingyu Zhao, 2010.
"
**On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions**," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(1), pages 107-127, June.- Boniface Mbih & Issofa Moyouwou & Xingyu Zhao, 2010.
"
**On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions**," Post-Print halshs-00476317, HAL.

- Boniface Mbih & Issofa Moyouwou & Xingyu Zhao, 2010.
"
- Fabrice Barthélémy & Dominique Lepelley & Mathieu Martin, 2013.
"
**On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games**," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(2), pages 263-279, July.- Fabrice Barthelemy & Dominique Lepelley & Mathieu Martin, 2011.
"
**On the Likelihood of Dummy players in Weighted Majority Games**," THEMA Working Papers 2011-17, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. - Fabrice Barthélémy & Dominique Lepelley & Mathieu Martin, 2012.
"
**On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games**," Post-Print hal-01243433, HAL.

- Fabrice Barthelemy & Dominique Lepelley & Mathieu Martin, 2011.
"
- Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2015.
"
**Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes**," Working Papers halshs-01241996, HAL. - Maurice Salles, 2014.
"
**‘Social choice and welfare’ at 30: its role in the development of social choice theory and welfare economics**," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 1-16, January. - Achill Schürmann, 2013.
"
**Exploiting polyhedral symmetries in social choice**," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1097-1110, April. - Cervone, Davide P. & Dai, Ronghua & Gnoutcheff, Daniel & Lanterman, Grant & Mackenzie, Andrew & Morse, Ari & Srivastava, Nikhil & Zwicker, William S., 2012.
"
**Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings**," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 11-27.

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