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The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule


  • Lepelley, Dominique
  • Mbih, Boniface


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  • Lepelley, Dominique & Mbih, Boniface, 1987. "The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 311-315.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:24:y:1987:i:4:p:311-315

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Peter J. Hammond, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 263-282.
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    Cited by:

    1. Slinko, Arkadii, 2004. "How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 289-293, May.
    2. Pritchard, Geoffrey & Wilson, Mark C., 2009. "Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 35-57, July.
    3. Geoffrey Pritchard & Mark Wilson, 2007. "Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(3), pages 487-513, October.
    4. Gehrlein, William V. & Moyouwou, Issofa & Lepelley, Dominique, 2013. "The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 352-365.
    5. Geoffrey Pritchard & Arkadii Slinko, 2006. "On the Average Minimum Size of a Manipulating Coalition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(2), pages 263-277, October.
    6. Mostapha Diss, 2015. "Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 229(1), pages 347-376, June.
    7. Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2009. "Gains from manipulating social choice rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(3), pages 349-371, September.
    8. repec:spr:grdene:v:17:y:2008:i:4:d:10.1007_s10726-007-9094-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:eee:matsoc:v:89:y:2017:i:c:p:70-82 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Wilson, Mark C. & Pritchard, Geoffrey, 2007. "Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 244-256, December.
    11. Arkadii Slinko, 2006. "How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 143-153, January.

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