On the Average Minimum Size of a Manipulating Coalition
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Volume (Year): 27 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Saari, Donald G, 1990. " Susceptibility to Manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 21-41, January.
- Brams, Steven J., 1994.
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 30, pages 1055-1089
- Lepelley, Dominique & Mbih, Boniface, 1987. "The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 311-315.
- Lepelley, Dominique & Valognes, Fabrice, 2003. " Voting Rules, Manipulability and Social Homogeneity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 165-84, July.
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