On the Average Minimum Size of a Manipulating Coalition
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Volume (Year): 27 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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- Lepelley, Dominique & Valognes, Fabrice, 2003.
"Voting Rules, Manipulability and Social Homogeneity,"
Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 165-184, July.
- Dominique Lepelley & Fabrice Valognes, 2003. "Voting rules manipulability and social homogeneity," Post-Print halshs-00069239, HAL.
- Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 2002. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 173-236 Elsevier.
- Brams, Steven J., 1994. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 30, pages 1055-1089 Elsevier.
- Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter, 1998. "Voting Procedures," Working Papers 98-30, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Lepelley, Dominique & Mbih, Boniface, 1987. "The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 311-315.
- Saari, Donald G, 1990. "Susceptibility to Manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 21-41, January. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)