Robustness against inefficient manipulation
No abstract is available for this item.
Volume (Year): 29 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dominique Lepelley & Fabrice Valognes, 2003.
"Voting rules manipulability and social homogeneity,"
- Lepelley, Dominique & Valognes, Fabrice, 2003. "Voting Rules, Manipulability and Social Homogeneity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 165-84, July.
- Kuga, Kiyoshi & Nagatani, Hiroaki, 1974. "Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(6), pages 1045-67, November.
- Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2005. "The inverse plurality rule—an axiomatization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(1), pages 173-178, October.
- Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
- Saari, Donald G, 1990. "Susceptibility to Manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 21-41, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:29:y:2007:i:1:p:55-67. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.