Approval voting and arrow's impossibility theorem
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- Gaertner, Wulf, 2002. "Domain restrictions," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 3, pages 131-170 Elsevier.
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More about this item
Keywordsapproval voting; majority voting; collective prefer- ence function; arrow’s impossibility theorem.;
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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