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Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: An impossibility result

Author

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  • Duddy, Conal

Abstract

We consider methods of electing a fixed number of candidates, greater than one, by approval ballot. We define a representativeness property and a Pareto property and show that these jointly imply manipulability.

Suggested Citation

  • Duddy, Conal, 2014. "Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: An impossibility result," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 14-16.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:1:p:14-16
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:78:y:1984:i:04:p:952-958_25 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:89:y:1995:i:04:p:925-940_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Ulle Endriss, 2013. "Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 335-355, March.
    4. Marc Vorsatz, 2007. "Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 127-141, January.
    5. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver, 2007. "A minimax procedure for electing committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 401-420, September.
    6. Steven J Brams & D Marc Kilgour, 2012. "Narrowing the field in elections: The Next-Two rule," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(4), pages 507-525, October.
    7. Hans Peters & Souvik Roy & Ton Storcken, 2012. "On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 399-429, July.
    8. Francesco Sinopoli & Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-François Laslier, 2006. "Approval voting: three examples," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(1), pages 27-38, December.
    9. Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
    10. repec:cup:apsrev:v:72:y:1978:i:03:p:831-847_15 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Approval Voting; Committee; Manipulability;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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