Approval consensus measures
In many realistic group decision making problems where a “representative” collective output must be produced, it is relevant to measure how much consensus this solution conveys to the group. Many aspects influence the final decision in group decision making problems. Two key issues are the experts’ individual opinions and the methodology followed to compute such a final decision (aggregation operators, voting systems, etc.). In this paper we consider situations where each member of a population decides upon approving or not approving each of a set of options. The experts express their opinions in a dichotomous way, e.g., because they intend to use approval voting. In order to measure the consensus or cohesiveness that the expression of the individual preferences conveys we propose the concept of approval consensus measure (ACM), which does not refer to any priors of the agents like preferences or other decision-making processes. Then we give axiomatic characterizations of two generic classes of ACMs.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2012|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Ðura-Georg Granić, 2012. "Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(1), pages 171-205, June.
- Jordi Massó & Marc Vorsatz, 2008.
"Weighted approval voting,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(1), pages 129-146, July.
- Jordi Massó & Marc Vorsatz, 2006. "Weighted Approval Voting," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 668.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Massó Jordi & Vorsatz Marc, 2006. "Weighted Approval Voting," Research Memorandum 038, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2006. "A Simple Characterization of Approval Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 621-625, December.
- Robert J. Weber, 1995. "Approval Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 39-49, Winter.
- Marc Vorsatz, 2007. "Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 127-141, January.
- Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "Approval Voting ion Dichotomous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 619.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)