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Approval consensus measures

Author

Listed:
  • Alcantud, José Carlos R.
  • de Andres Calle, Rocio
  • Cascon, José Manuel

Abstract

In many realistic group decision making problems where a “representative” collective output must be produced, it is relevant to measure how much consensus this solution conveys to the group. Many aspects influence the final decision in group decision making problems. Two key issues are the experts’ individual opinions and the methodology followed to compute such a final decision (aggregation operators, voting systems, etc.). In this paper we consider situations where each member of a population decides upon approving or not approving each of a set of options. The experts express their opinions in a dichotomous way, e.g., because they intend to use approval voting. In order to measure the consensus or cohesiveness that the expression of the individual preferences conveys we propose the concept of approval consensus measure (ACM), which does not refer to any priors of the agents like preferences or other decision-making processes. Then we give axiomatic characterizations of two generic classes of ACMs.

Suggested Citation

  • Alcantud, José Carlos R. & de Andres Calle, Rocio & Cascon, José Manuel, 2012. "Approval consensus measures," MPRA Paper 39610, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:39610
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2006. "A Simple Characterization of Approval Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 621-625, December.
    2. Jordi Massó & Marc Vorsatz, 2008. "Weighted approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(1), pages 129-146, July.
    3. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Ðura-Georg Granić, 2012. "Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(1), pages 171-205, June.
    4. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Approval Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 831-847, September.
    5. Robert J. Weber, 1995. "Approval Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 39-49, Winter.
    6. Marc Vorsatz, 2007. "Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 127-141, January.
    7. Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
    8. Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), 2010. "Handbook on Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, number 978-3-642-02839-7, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Marc Vorsatz, 2016. "Do we agree? Measuring the cohesiveness of preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(2), pages 313-339, February.
    2. González-Arteaga, T. & Alcantud, J.C.R. & de Andrés Calle, R., 2016. "A cardinal dissensus measure based on the Mahalanobis distance," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 251(2), pages 575-585.
    3. José Carlos R. Alcantud & María José M. Torrecillas, 2017. "Consensus measures for various informational bases. Three new proposals and two case studies from political science," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 285-306, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Approval voting; Consensus measures; Tanimoto similarity index;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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