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Making statements and approval voting

Author

Listed:
  • Enriqueta Aragones

    ()

  • Itzhak Gilboa

    ()

  • Andrew Weiss

    ()

Abstract

We assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections than a comparable system with plurality rule.
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Suggested Citation

  • Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Weiss, 2011. "Making statements and approval voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 461-472, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:71:y:2011:i:4:p:461-472 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-010-9208-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:02:p:319-333_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Lohmann, Susanne, 1994. "Information Aggregation through Costly Political Action," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 518-530, June.
    3. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
    4. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    5. repec:cup:apsrev:v:72:y:1978:i:03:p:831-847_15 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Enriqueta Aragonés & Andrew Postlewaite, 1999. "Ambiguity in election games," Economics Working Papers 364, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    7. Robert J. Weber, 1995. "Approval Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 39-49, Winter.
    8. Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Miguel Angel Ballester & Pedro Rey-Biel, 2007. "Sincere Voting with Cardinal Preferences: Approval Voting," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 675.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Approval voting; Turnout;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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