Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes
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- Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi, 2016. "Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 97-116, October.
- Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi, 2016. "Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes," Post-Print halshs-01381394, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi, 2016. "Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes," Working Papers halshs-01285526, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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"The True Impact of Voting Rule Selection on Condorcet Efficiency,"
Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(4), pages 2418-2426.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2018.
"The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency,"
Working Papers
hal-01757761, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2018. "The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency," Working Papers halshs-01817943, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2018. "The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency," Working Papers 1812, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Daniela Bubboloni & Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori, 2020.
"Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 151-185, April.
- Daniela Bubboloni & Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori, 2018. "Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting," Working Papers 1813, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Daniela Bubboloni & Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori, 2018. "Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting," Working Papers halshs-01827668, HAL.
- Daniela Bubboloni & Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori, 2020. "Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting," Post-Print halshs-02393100, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2020. "Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation," Post-Print hal-02424936, HAL.
- Diss, Mostapha & Mahajne, Muhammad, 2020.
"Social acceptability of Condorcet committees,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 14-27.
- Mostapha Diss & Muhammad Mahajne, 2019. "Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees," Working Papers halshs-02003292, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Muhammad Mahajne, 2019. "Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees," Working Papers 1906, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Mostapha Diss & Muhammad Mahajne, 2019. "Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees," Working Papers halshs-02011732, HAL.
- Edith Elkind & Piotr Faliszewski & Piotr Skowron & Arkadii Slinko, 2017. "Properties of multiwinner voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(3), pages 599-632, March.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2020.
"On Some k -scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle,"
Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(5), pages 699-725.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2020. "On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle," Post-Print hal-02147735, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui, 2019. "Condorcet efficiency of general weighted scoring rules under IAC: indifference and abstention," Working Papers hal-02196387, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui & Eric Kamwa, 2021. "Condorcet efficiency of general weighted scoring rules under IAC: indifference and abstention," Post-Print hal-02196387, HAL.
- Moyouwou, Issofa & Tchantcho, Hugue, 2017. "Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 70-82.
- Abdelhalim El Ouafdi & Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui, 2020. "Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 88(2), pages 205-229, March.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2019. "On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle," Working Papers hal-02147735, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2019.
"Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation,"
Working Papers
hal-02424936, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2020. "Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation," Post-Print hal-02424936, HAL.
- Dan S. Felsenthal & Hannu Nurmi, 2018. "Monotonicity Violations by Borda’s Elimination and Nanson’s Rules: A Comparison," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 637-664, August.
- Dougherty, Keith L. & Heckelman, Jac C., 2020. "The probability of violating Arrow’s conditions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Multi-winner voting rules; committee; Condorcet committee efficiency; paradoxes; probability;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2016-03-29 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-2016-03-29 (Microeconomics)
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