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A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions


  • Samuel Merrill


This essay evaluates six single-winner, multicandidate electoral systems with respect to their tendency to choose Condorcet candidates. To this end I calibrate a logistic multiple regression model from Monte Carlo simulations, based on a multivariate normal spatial model, in which I vary the number of candidates, number of dimensions, correlation structure, and relative dispersion of candidates and voters. I investigate additional spatial-model variations by comparing further simulation results with predictions of the basic statistical model. The results suggest that for many electoral systems, Condorcet efficiency would increase with perceptual uncertainty of candidates' positions and would be low in a polarized society. Of the voting systems studied, approval voting and the Coombs systems appear least sensitive to variations in assumptions. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985

Suggested Citation

  • Samuel Merrill, 1985. "A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 389-403, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:47:y:1985:i:2:p:389-403
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00127534

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:71:y:1977:i:01:p:111-130_25 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:72:y:1978:i:04:p:1341-1356_15 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Samuel Merrill, 1981. "Strategic decisions under one-stage multi-candidate voting systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 115-134, January.
    4. Nurmi, Hannu, 1983. "Voting Procedures: A Summary Analysis," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 181-208, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi, 2016. "Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 97-116, October.
    2. repec:kap:pubcho:v:173:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0476-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Matteo Migheli & Guido Ortona & Ferruccio Ponzano, 2014. "Competition among parties and power: an empirical analysis," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 215(1), pages 201-214, April.
    4. repec:ris:actuec:0169 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Menezes, Mozart B.C. & da Silveira, Giovani J.C. & Drezner, Zvi, 2016. "Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and Approval Voting compared with Median and Coverage locations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 253(1), pages 195-203.

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