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Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rule

Author

Listed:
  • Marcus Pivato

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

Abstract

Given a large enough population of voters whose utility functions satisfy certain statistical regularities, we show that voting rules such as the Borda rule, approval voting, and evaluative voting have a very high probability of selecting the social alternative which maximizes the utilitarian social welfare function. We also characterize the speed with which this probability approaches one as the population grows.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rule," Post-Print hal-02980107, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02980107
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Dirk Helbing & Farzam Fanitabasi & Fosca Giannotti & Regula Hänggli & Carina I. Hausladen & Jeroen van den Hoven & Sachit Mahajan & Dino Pedreschi & Evangelos Pournaras, 2021. "Ethics of Smart Cities: Towards Value-Sensitive Design and Co-Evolving City Life," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(20), pages 1-25, October.
    3. Aidan Lyon & Michael Morreau, 2018. "The wisdom of collective grading and the effects of epistemic and semantic diversity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(1), pages 99-116, July.
    4. Andreas Darmann & Daniel Eckert & Christian Klamler, 2025. "Rank information and inequality in social welfare functions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 98(4), pages 473-487, June.
    5. Charles F. Manski, 2024. "Using Ordinal Voting to Compare the Utilitarian Welfare of a Status Quo and A Proposed Policy: A Simple Nonparametric Analysis," Papers 2412.18714, arXiv.org.
    6. Xinli Guo, 2025. "Bailouts by Representation: A Minimal TLC Theory with Weighted Consent," Papers 2508.08693, arXiv.org.
    7. Pivato, Marcus, 2015. "Condorcet meets Bentham," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 58-65.
    8. Peter Postl, 2017. "Évaluation et comparaison des règles de vote derrière le voile de l’ignorance : Tour d'horizon sélectif et analyse des règles de scores à deux paramètres," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 93(1-2), pages 249-290.
    9. Lederer, Patrick, 2024. "Bivariate scoring rules: Unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    10. Sandro Ambuehl & B. Douglas Bernheim, 2021. "Social preferences over ordinal outcomes," ECON - Working Papers 395, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Dec 2024.
    11. Sandro Ambuehl & B. Douglas Bernheim, 2021. "Interpreting the Will of the People: A Positive Analysis of Ordinal Preference Aggregation," NBER Working Papers 29389, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Statistical Utilitarianism," Studies in Political Economy, in: Maria Gallego & Norman Schofield (ed.), The Political Economy of Social Choices, pages 187-204, Springer.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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