Constant scoring rules for choosing one among many alternatives
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00144260
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Cited by:
- Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2016.
"Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 80(3), pages 473-494, March.
- Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2015. "Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes," Working Papers 1533, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Mostapha Diss, 2016. "Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes," Post-Print halshs-01196091, HAL.
- Kamwa, Eric & Merlin, Vincent, 2015.
"Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 130-138.
- Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2014. "Scoring Rules over Subsets of Alternatives: Consistency and Paradoxes," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201412, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2015. "Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes," Post-Print hal-01702492, HAL.
- Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2015. "Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes," Post-Print halshs-01238563, HAL.
- Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 2000. "The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 191-197, February.
- Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 1997. "Condorcet's paradox under the maximal culture condition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 85-89, August.
- Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2016.
"Probabilities of Consistent Election Outcomes with Majorities Based on Difference in Support,"
Group Decision and Negotiation,
Springer, vol. 25(5), pages 967-994, September.
- Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2016. "Probabilities of Consistent Election Outcomes with Majorities Based on Difference in Support," Post-Print halshs-01289319, HAL.
- Yuliya A. Veselova, 2016. "Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?," HSE Working papers WP BRP 152/EC/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
- Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2015. "Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes," Working Papers halshs-01241996, HAL.
- Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 1998. "The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 271-283, April.
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