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Constant scoring rules for choosing one among many alternatives

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  • William Gehrlein
  • Peter Fishburn

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Suggested Citation

  • William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn, 1981. "Constant scoring rules for choosing one among many alternatives," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 203-210, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:qualqt:v:15:y:1981:i:2:p:203-210
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00144260
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chamberlin, John R. & Cohen, Michael D., 1978. "Toward Applicable Social Choice Theory: A Comparison of Social Choice Functions under Spatial Model Assumptions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(4), pages 1341-1356, December.
    2. Kuga, Kiyoshi & Nagatani, Hiroaki, 1974. "Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(6), pages 1045-1067, November.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2016. "Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(3), pages 473-494, March.
    2. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 1997. "Condorcet's paradox under the maximal culture condition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 85-89, August.
    3. Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2016. "Probabilities of Consistent Election Outcomes with Majorities Based on Difference in Support," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(5), pages 967-994, September.
    4. Yuliya A. Veselova, 2020. "Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 523-548, June.
    5. Kamwa, Eric & Merlin, Vincent, 2015. "Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 130-138.
    6. William Gehrlein, 1999. "On the Probability that all Weighted Scoring Rules Elect the Condorcet Winner," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 77-84, February.
    7. Dominique Lepelley & William Gehrlein, 1999. "A Note on the Probability of Having a Strong Condorcet Winner," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 85-96, February.
    8. Yuliya A. Veselova, 2016. "Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?," HSE Working papers WP BRP 152/EC/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    9. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 1998. "The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 271-283, April.
    10. Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2015. "Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes," Working Papers halshs-01241996, HAL.
    11. Williams Gehrlein, 1993. "Condorcet efficiency of two stage constant scoring rules," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 95-101, February.
    12. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 2000. "The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 191-197, February.

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