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Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences

Author

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  • Mostapha Diss

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • Michele Gori

    (UniFI - Università degli Studi di Firenze = University of Florence = Université de Florence)

Abstract

We characterize the positional social preference correspondences (spc) satisfying the qualified majority property for any given majority threshold. We also characterize the positional spcs satisfying the minimal majority property. We next evaluate the probability that the Borda, the Plurality and the Antiplurality spcs fulfil the two aforementioned properties under two assumptions on individuals' preferences in the presence of three and four alternatives for various sizes of the society. Our results show that the Borda spc is the positional spc which better behaves in relation with the qualified majority principle and the minimal majority principle. Finally, we propose some remarks on the concept of Condorcet consistency for social choice correspondences.

Suggested Citation

  • Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori, 2020. "Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences," Working Papers hal-04251726, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04251726
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://univ-fcomte.hal.science/hal-04251726v1
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    File URL: https://univ-fcomte.hal.science/hal-04251726v1/document
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    Cited by:

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    2. Clinton Gubong Gassi & Eric Kamwa, 2024. "q-fixed majority efficiency of committee scoring rules," Working Papers hal-04730580, HAL.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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