Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.08.008
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Other versions of this item:
- Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2014. "Scoring Rules over Subsets of Alternatives: Consistency and Paradoxes," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201412, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2015. "Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes," Post-Print hal-01702492, HAL.
- Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2015. "Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes," Post-Print halshs-01238563, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi, 2016.
"Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes,"
Public Choice,
Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 97-116, October.
- Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi, 2016. "Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes," Working Papers halshs-01285526, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi, 2016. "Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes," Post-Print halshs-01381394, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi, 2016. "Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes," Working Papers 1613, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- repec:spr:qualqt:v:51:y:2017:i:6:d:10.1007_s11135-016-0446-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:spr:sochwe:v:48:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1026-z is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
Keywords
Scoring rule; Consistency; Collective ranking; Committee; Paradox; Impartial culture;JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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