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The negative participation paradox in three-candidate instant runoff elections

Author

Listed:
  • David McCune

    (William Jewell College)

  • Jennifer Wilson

    (The New School)

Abstract

We provide theoretical and empirical estimates for the likelihood of a negative participation paradox under instant runoff voting in three-candidate elections. We determine the probability of the paradox and related conditional probabilities based on the impartial anonymous culture and impartial culture models for both complete and partial ballots. We compare these results to the empirical likelihood of a negative participation paradox occurring under instant runoff voting in a large database of voter profiles which have been reduced to three candidates. Lastly, we analyze the relative likelihood of this paradox in comparison to other well-known paradoxes.

Suggested Citation

  • David McCune & Jennifer Wilson, 2025. "The negative participation paradox in three-candidate instant runoff elections," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 98(4), pages 537-559, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:98:y:2025:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-025-10026-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-025-10026-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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