On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle
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- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2020. "On Some k -scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(5), pages 699-725.
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- Eric Kamwa, 2021. "To what extent does the model of processing sincereincomplete rankings affect the likelihood of thetruncation paradox?," Working Papers hal-02879390, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori, 2020. "Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences," Working Papers 2020-06, CRESE.
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More about this item
Keywords
Scoring rules; Chamberlin-Courant; Borda; Condorcet; Voting; Committee;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2020-04-13 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DES-2020-04-13 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2020-04-13 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2020-04-13 (Positive Political Economics)
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