Borda’s Paradox with weighted scoring rules
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Volume (Year): 38 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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- Thom Bezembinder, 1996. "The plurality majority converse under single peakedness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 365-380.
- Tataru, Maria & Merlin, Vincent, 1997. "On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 81-90, August.
- Van Newenhizen, Jill, 1992. "The Borda Method Is Most Likely to Respect the Condorcet Principle," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 69-83, January.
- Davide Cervone & William Gehrlein & William Zwicker, 2005. "Which Scoring Rule Maximizes Condorcet Efficiency Under Iac?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 145-185, 03.
- Gehrlein, William V., 2004. "The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 69-85, January.
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