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The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters

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  • Gehrlein, William V.
  • Lepelley, Dominique

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  • Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 2001. "The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 39-50, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:41:y:2001:i:1:p:39-50
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Van Newenhizen, Jill, 1992. "The Borda Method Is Most Likely to Respect the Condorcet Principle," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(1), pages 69-83, January.
    2. Stensholt, Eivind, 1999. "Beta distributions in a simplex and impartial anonymous cultures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 45-57, January.
    3. Gehrlein, William V., 1982. "Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 123-130, March.
    4. William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn, 1976. "Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, June.
    5. Kuga, Kiyoshi & Nagatani, Hiroaki, 1974. "Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(6), pages 1045-1067, November.
    6. Sven Berg, 1985. "Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 377-387, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi, 2016. "Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 97-116, October.
    2. repec:spr:qualqt:v:51:y:2017:i:6:d:10.1007_s11135-016-0446-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Regenwetter, Michel & Grofman, Bernard & Marley, A. A. J., 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 451-466, July.
    4. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Florenz Plassmann, 2016. "Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(4), pages 707-747, April.
    5. Gehrlein, William V. & Moyouwou, Issofa & Lepelley, Dominique, 2013. "The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 352-365.
    6. William Gehrlein, 2006. "The sensitivity of weight selection for scoring rules to profile proximity to single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 191-208, January.
    7. Kangas, Annika & Laukkanen, Sanna & Kangas, Jyrki, 2006. "Social choice theory and its applications in sustainable forest management--a review," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 77-92, November.
    8. Lepelley, Dominique & Gehrlein, William V., 2000. "Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 157-164, August.
    9. Gehrlein, William V., 2004. "The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 69-85, January.
    10. repec:eee:matsoc:v:87:y:2017:i:c:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Michel Regenwetter & James Adams & Bernard Grofman, 2002. "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 153-186, September.

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