IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v47y1985i2p377-387.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity

Author

Listed:
  • Sven Berg

Abstract

We propose a simple Pólya-variety urn model for calculating paradox-of-voting probabilities. The model contains a homogeneity parameter, and for specific values of this parameter the model reduces to cases previously discussed in the literature. We derive a Dirichlet family of distributions for describing the assignment of preference profiles in large committees, and we show how the homogeneity parameter relates to measures of similarity among voters, suggested in prior studies. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985

Suggested Citation

  • Sven Berg, 1985. "Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 377-387, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:47:y:1985:i:2:p:377-387
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00127533
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00127533
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. Abrams, 1976. "The voter's paradox and the homogeneity of individual preference orders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 19-27, June.
    2. Sven Berg & Bo Bjurulf, 1983. "A note on the paradox of voting: Anonymous preference profiles and May's formula," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 307-316, January.
    3. William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn, 1976. "Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, June.
    4. Kuga, Kiyoshi & Nagatani, Hiroaki, 1974. "Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(6), pages 1045-1067, November.
    5. Jamison, Dean & Luce, Edward, 1972. "Social homogeneity and the probability of intransitive majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 79-87, August.
    6. Niemi, Richard G., 1969. "Majority Decision-Making with Partial Unidimensionality," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 488-497, June.
    7. DeMeyer, Frank & Plott, Charles R, 1970. "The Probability of a Cyclical Majority," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(2), pages 345-354, March.
    8. Gehrlein, William V., 1981. "The expected probability of Condorcet's paradox," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 33-37.
    9. Peter Fishburn & William Gehrlein, 1980. "Social homogeneity and Condorcet's paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 403-419, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jansen, C. & Schollmeyer, G. & Augustin, T., 2018. "A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 49-62.
    2. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique & Moyouwou, Issofa, 2016. "A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 115-122.
    3. Cres, Herve & Tvede, Mich, 2001. "Ordering Pareto-optima through majority voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 295-325, May.
    4. Yuliya Veselova, 2016. "The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(3), pages 609-638, March.
    5. John C. McCabe-Dansted & Arkadii Slinko, 2006. "Exploratory Analysis of Similarities Between Social Choice Rules," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 77-107, January.
    6. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2015. "The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 243-269, March.
    7. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 1997. "Condorcet's paradox under the maximal culture condition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 85-89, August.
    8. Tataru, Maria & Merlin, Vincent, 1997. "On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 81-90, August.
    9. James Green-Armytage & T. Nicolaus Tideman & Rafael Cosman, 2016. "Statistical evaluation of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 183-212, January.
    10. James Green-Armytage & T. Tideman & Rafael Cosman, 2016. "Statistical evaluation of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 183-212, January.
    11. Marie-Louise Lackner & Martin Lackner, 2017. "On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(4), pages 717-745, April.
    12. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 2001. "The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 39-50, January.
    13. Merlin, V. & Tataru, M. & Valognes, F., 2000. "On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 183-207, March.
    14. Cervone, Davide P. & Dai, Ronghua & Gnoutcheff, Daniel & Lanterman, Grant & Mackenzie, Andrew & Morse, Ari & Srivastava, Nikhil & Zwicker, William S., 2012. "Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 11-27.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:47:y:1985:i:2:p:377-387. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.