Majority Decision-Making with Partial Unidimensionality
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- William Riker, 1987. "The lessons of 1787," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 5-34, September.
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- Achuthankutty, Gopakumar & Roy, Souvik, 2017.
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- Gopakumar Achuthankutty & Souvik Roy, 2020. "Strategy-proof rules on partially single-peaked domains," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2020-020, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
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- William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn, 1976. "Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, June.
- Michel Regenwetter & James Adams & Bernard Grofman, 2002. "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 153-186, September.
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