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On the Kim and Roush Voting Procedure

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  • Dominique Lepelley

    (/C.R.E.M.E., Université de Caen)

  • Fabrice Valognes

    (/C.R.E.M.E., Université de Caen)

Abstract

We study in this paper some features of a new voting rule recently proposed by K.H. Kim and F.W. Roush. The (conjectural) optimality of this voting rule with respect to statistical manipulability by coalitions is discussed under two alternative probabilistic assumptions, namely the impartial culture condition (IC) and the impartial anonymous culture condition (IAC). We also analyze the ability of Kim and Roush procedure to fulfil the Condorcet conditions. Some representations of its Condorcet efficiency in three-alternative elections are obtained.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Lepelley & Fabrice Valognes, 1999. "On the Kim and Roush Voting Procedure," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 109-123, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:8:y:1999:i:2:d:10.1023_a:1008610701801
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008610701801
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barnett,William A. & Moulin,Hervé & Salles,Maurice & Schofield,Norman J. (ed.), 1995. "Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521443401.
    2. William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn, 1976. "Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, June.
    3. Lepelley, Dominique, 1993. "On the probability of electing the Condorcet," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 105-116, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Regenwetter, Michel & Grofman, Bernard & Marley, A. A. J., 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 451-466, July.
    2. Merlin, V. & Tataru, M. & Valognes, F., 2000. "On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 183-207, March.

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