IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions

  • Effrosyni Diamantoudi

This paper extends the work of Ray and Vohra [3]. It ascertains which partitions of players will emerge and what actions will these players choose under each partition, when they can sign binding agreements and their actions have externalities. The emphasis, however, is placed on situations with multiple outcomes and how agents behave in the presence of such multiplicity. In particular, a deviating coalition considers all the likely outcomes that may prevail upon its deviation, and selects (if possible) a subset of them. Three augmentations of Ray and Vohra's [3] solution concept are defined, capturing three distinct behavioral assumptions. Efficiency of and the relation between the three notions are discussed. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-002-0301-z
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 22 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (09)
Pages: 431-446

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:22:y:2003:i:2:p:431-446
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

Order Information: Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-336, January.
  2. Elliott, Graham & Jansson, Michael, 2003. "Testing for unit roots with stationary covariates," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 75-89, July.
  3. Boriss Siliverstovs, . "The Bi-parameter Smooth Transition AutoRegressive model," Economics Working Papers 2000-16, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  4. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
  5. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
  6. Effrosyni Diamantoudi, . "Equilibrium Binding Agreements under Diverse Bahavioral Assumptions," Economics Working Papers 2001-9, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  7. Licun Xue, . "A Notion of Consistent Rationalizability - Between Weak and Pearce's Extensive Form Rationalizability," Economics Working Papers 2000-4, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  8. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, . "Farsighted Stability in Hedonic Games," Economics Working Papers 2000-12, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  9. Donsimoni, Marie-Paule & Economides, Nicholas S & Polemarchakis, Herakles M, 1986. "Stable Cartels," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(2), pages 317-27, June.
  10. Peter Skott, . "Demand Policy in the Long Run," Economics Working Papers 2000-17, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  11. Niels Haldrup & Peter Lildholdt, . "Local Power Functions of Tests for Double Unit Roots," Economics Working Papers 2000-2, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  12. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
  13. Jamsheed Shorish, . "Quasi-Static Macroeconomic Systems," Economics Working Papers 2000-3, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  14. Licun Xue, . "Stable Agreements in Infinitely Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 2000-13, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  15. Paul Auerbach & Peter Skott, . "Skill Asymmetries, Increasing Wage Inequality and Unemployment," Economics Working Papers 2000-18, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  16. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & JACQUEMIN, Alexis & GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & WEYMARK, John A., . "On the stability of collusive price leadership," CORE Discussion Papers RP -522, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  17. Michael Rosholm & Michael Svarer, . "Structurally Dependent Competing Risks," Economics Working Papers 2000-11, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  18. Jakob Roland Munch & Michael Svarer, . "Mortality and Socio-economic Differences in a Competing Risks Model," Economics Working Papers 2001-1, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:22:y:2003:i:2:p:431-446. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)

or (Christopher F Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.