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Equilibrium binding agreements: a comment

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  • Haeringer, Guillaume

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  • Haeringer, Guillaume, 2004. "Equilibrium binding agreements: a comment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 140-143, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:117:y:2004:i:1:p:140-143
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paola Conconi & Carlo Perroni, 2002. "Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in International Negotiations," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5839, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    2. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
    3. Effrosyni Diamantoudi, 2003. "Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(2), pages 431-446, September.
    4. Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo, 2002. "Issue linkage and issue tie-in in multilateral negotiations," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 423-447, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Finus, Michael & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2013. "The role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 29-43.
    2. Finus, Michael & McGinty, Matthew, 2015. "The Anti-Paradox of Cooperation: Diversity Pays!," Department of Economics Working Papers 46599, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    3. By Michael Finus & Raoul Schneider, 2015. "Scope and compatibility of measures in international fisheries agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 865-888.
    4. Aldashev, Gani & Marini, Marco & Verdier, Thierry, 2010. "Brothers in Alms? Coordination between NGOs on Markets for Development Donations," CEPR Discussion Papers 8109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2009. "Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 389-406, March.
    6. Pedro Pintassilgo & Michael Finus & Marko Lindroos & Gordon Munro, 2010. "Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(3), pages 377-402, July.
    7. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    8. Omer Biran, 2013. "Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(1), pages 117-136, July.
    9. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2013. "Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2013-1, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    10. Bayramoglu, Basak & Finus, Michael & Jaques, Jean-Francois, 2016. "Climate Agreements in a Mitigation-Adaptation Game," Department of Economics Working Papers 58130, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    11. Biran, Omer, 2011. "Mécanismes d'échange en présence d'externalités," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/7238 edited by Forges, Françoise, July.
    12. Pintassilgo, Pedro & Finus, Michael & Lindroos, Marko & Munro, Gordon R., 2008. "Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 6376, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).

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