Climate Agreements in a Mitigation-Adaptation Game
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- Basak Bayramoglu & Michael Finus & Jean-Francois Jaques, 2016. "Climate Agreements in a Mitigation-Adaptation Game," Department of Economics Working Papers 51/16, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
KeywordsClimate Change; Mitigation-Adaptation Game; Public Good Agreements; Strategic Substitutes versus Complements;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-07-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2016-07-09 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2016-07-09 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2016-07-09 (Game Theory)
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