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Public Good Provision and Ancillary Benefits: The Case of Climate Agreements

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  • Michael Finus

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  • Dirk Rübbelke

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Abstract

Several studies found ancillary benefits of the provision of public goods to be of considerable size. If these additional private benefits were noticed, they would imply not only higher cooperative but also non-cooperative provision levels. However, beyond these largely undisputed important quantitative effects, there would be qualitative and strategic implications associated with ancillary benefits: public policy would no longer be a pure but an impure public good. In this paper, we investigate these implications in a setting of non-cooperative coalition formation in the context of climate change. In particular, we address the following question. Would ancillary benefits if they were taken in consideration increase participation in international climate agreements and raise the success of these treaties in welfare terms? Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Finus & Dirk Rübbelke, 2013. "Public Good Provision and Ancillary Benefits: The Case of Climate Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(2), pages 211-226, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:56:y:2013:i:2:p:211-226
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-012-9570-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ancillary benefits; Impure public goods; Coalition formation; Game theory; Climate policy; C72; H87; Q54;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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