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North-South Climate Change Negotiations:a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

  • Alexandro Caparros

    (IEG - Department of Economics, Institute of Economics and Geography (IEG) - Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC))

  • Jean-Christophe Pereau

    (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - CIRAD : UMR56 - CNRS : UMR8568 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Ecole des Ponts ParisTech - Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural des Eaux et Forêts)

  • Tarik Tazdait

    (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - CIRAD : UMR56 - CNRS : UMR8568 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Ecole des Ponts ParisTech - Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural des Eaux et Forêts)

This article determines the conditions under which theSouthern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and with asymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results show that, depending on their characteristics, the different players can obtain benefits delaying the moment of the agreement.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00009823.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Publication status: Published, Public Choice, 2004, 121, 3-4, 455-480
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00009823
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00009823/en/
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