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Renegotiations in the Greenhouse

  • Hans-Peter Weikard

    ()

  • Rob Dellink
  • Ekko Ierland

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10640-009-9329-x
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Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 45 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
Pages: 573-596

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Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:45:y:2010:i:4:p:573-596
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263

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  1. Hans-Peter Weikard & Rob Dellink, 2008. "Sticks and Carrots for the Design of International Climate Agreements with Renegotiations," Working Papers 2008.26, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  2. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991. "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December.
  4. GERMAIN, Marc & TOINT, Philippe & TULKENS, Henry & DE ZEEUW, Aart, . "Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1637, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Alejandro Caparrós & Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdaït, 2003. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2003.09, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  6. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1987. "Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9wv3h5jb, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  7. Michael Finus & Ekko Ierland & Rob Dellink, 2006. "Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 271-291, August.
  8. M Sáiz & Eligius Hendrix & Niels Olieman, 2006. "On the Computation of Stability in Multiple Coalition Formation Games," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(3), pages 251-275, October.
  9. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-112000 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Frederick Ploeg & Aart Zeeuw, 1992. "International aspects of pollution control," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 117-139, March.
  11. Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Michael Finus, 2006. "Permit trading and stability of international climate agreements," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 19-48, May.
  12. Hans-Peter Weikard & Michael Finus & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera, 2006. "The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 209-232, April.
  13. Asheim, Geir B. & Froyn, Camilla Bretteville & Hovi, Jon & Menz, Fredric C., 2006. "Regional versus global cooperation for climate control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 93-109, January.
  14. Nagashima, Miyuki & Dellink, Rob & van Ierland, Ekko & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2009. "Stability of international climate coalitions -- A comparison of transfer schemes," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(5), pages 1476-1487, March.
  15. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 1998. "Renegotiation–Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(3), pages 275-306, October.
  16. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  17. Germain, M. & Toint, Ph. & Tulkens, H. & de Zeeuw, A.J., 2003. "Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control," Other publications TiSEM 8953bc6e-fc65-4fd7-a2d1-6, School of Economics and Management.
  18. Rob Dellink & Michael Finus & Niels Olieman, 2008. "The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 39(4), pages 357-377, April.
  19. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
  20. Rubio, S. & Ulph, A., 2002. "A simple dynamic model of international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0209, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  21. Ciscar, Juan Carlos & Soria, Antonio, 2002. "Prospective analysis of beyond Kyoto climate policy: a sequential game framework," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(15), pages 1327-1335, December.
  22. Na, Seong-lin & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 173-85, April.
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