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The gamma-core and coalition formation

  • Parkash Chander

    ()

This paper reinterprets by [gamma]-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that is, it is the final and not the immediate payoffs that matter to the coalitions)and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation by a coalition, the nonmembers will have incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of the [gamma]-characteristic function, and that the grand coalition is the only stable coalition structure.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-006-0067-9
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Article provided by Springer & Game Theory Society in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 35 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
Pages: 539-556

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2007:i:4:p:539-556
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0067-9
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  1. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
  2. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
  3. Farrell, Joseph & Saloner, Garth, 1987. "Coordination Through Committees and Markets," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt5sn4b6v4, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  4. Foley, Duncan K, 1970. "Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(1), pages 66-72, January.
  5. Carsten Helm, 2001. "On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(1), pages 141-146.
  6. TULKENS, Henry, 1997. "Cooperation vs. free riding in international environmental affairs: two approaches," CORE Discussion Papers 1997052, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. DIAMANTOUDI, Effrosyni & XUE, Licun, 2002. "Coalitions, agreements and efficiency," CORE Discussion Papers 2002047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," Working Papers 897, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  9. Belleflamme, Paul, 2000. "Stable Coalition Structures with Open Membership and Asymmetric Firms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21, January.
  10. Herbert E. Scarf, 1970. "On the Existence of a Cooperative Solution for a General Class of N-Person Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 293, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  11. Chander, Parkash, 1993. "Dynamic Procedures and Incentives in Public Good Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1341-54, November.
  12. Parkash Chander, 1998. "International Treaties on Global Pollution: A Dynamic Time-Path Analysis," Economics Working Paper Archive 400, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  13. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1996. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers 0068, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  14. Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
  15. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
  16. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
  17. Roberts, Donald John, 1974. "The Lindahl solution for economies with public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 23-42, February.
  18. Moulin, Herve, 1987. "Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 963-76, July.
  19. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
  20. Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August.
  21. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
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