Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
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- Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, "undated". "Coalitions, Agreements and Efficiency," Economics Working Papers 2002-9, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
- DIAMANTOUDI, Effrosyni & XUE, Licun, 2002. "Coalitions, agreements and efficiency," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2002047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
References listed on IDEAS
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JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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