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Coalition formation among farsighted agents

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  • Herings, P.J.J.

    (Microeconomics & Public Economics)

  • Mauleon, A.

    (Externe publicaties SBE)

  • Vannetelbosch, V.

    (Externe publicaties SBE)

Abstract

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers.
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Suggested Citation

  • Herings, P.J.J. & Mauleon, A. & Vannetelbosch, V., 2010. "Coalition formation among farsighted agents," Research Memorandum 025, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2010025
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2010025
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ata Atay & Sylvain Funck & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2023. "Matching markets with farsighted couples," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2023/445, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Mert Kimya, 2023. "Coalition Formation Under Dominance Invariance," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 480-496, June.
    3. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2023. "Social Rationalizability with Mediation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 440-461, June.
    4. Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi & ANA MAULEON & JOSE J. SEMPERE-MONERRIS & VINCENT VANNETELBOSCH, 2016. "Contractually Stable Alliances," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(2), pages 212-225, April.
    5. Anindya Bhattacharya & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2012. "On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 537-552, July.
    6. Leonardo Boncinelli & Alessio Muscillo & Paolo Pin, 2022. "Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 1101-1129, December.
    7. Maria Montero, 2023. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 525-548, June.
    8. Ana Mauleon & Elena Molis & Vincent Vannetelbosch & Wouter Vergote, 2014. "Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 925-943, November.
    9. Emmanuel Petrakis & Nikolas Tsakas, 2018. "The effect of entry on R&D networks," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(3), pages 706-750, September.
    10. Kawasaki, Ryo & Sato, Takashi & Muto, Shigeo, 2015. "Farsightedly stable tariffs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 118-124.
    11. Greg Leo & Yevgeniy Vorobeychik & Myrna Wooders, 2023. "Subgame Perfect Coalition Formation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 510-524, June.
    12. Alejandro Caparrós & Eric Giraud-Héraud & Abdelhakim Hammoudi & Tarik Tazdaït, 2011. "Coalition Stability with Heterogeneous Agents," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(1), pages 286-296.
    13. Kawasaki, Ryo, 2015. "Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann–Morgenstern farsighted stable sets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 8-12.

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    JEL classification:

    • C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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