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On coalition formation: durable coalition structures

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  • Barbera, Salvador
  • Gerber, Anke

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  • Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2003. "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 185-203, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:45:y:2003:i:2:p:185-203
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    1. José Alcalde & Pablo Revilla, 2001. "Tops Responsiveness, Strategy-Proofness And Coalition Formation Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-11, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    2. Guesnerie, Roger & Oddou, Claude, 1981. "Second best taxation as a game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 67-91, August.
    3. Greenberg Joseph & Weber Shlomo, 1993. "Stable Coalition Structures with a Unidimensional Set of Alternatives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 62-82, June.
    4. Bhattacharya, Anindya, 2002. "Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 27-44, January.
    5. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
    6. Anke Gerber, 2000. "original papers : Coalition formation in general NTU games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 5(2), pages 149-175.
    7. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-1064, July.
    8. Dutta, Bhaskar & Masso, Jordi, 1997. "Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 464-475, August.
    9. Demange, Gabrielle, 1994. "Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 45-58, January.
    10. Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May.
    11. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, 2003. "Farsighted stability in hedonic games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(1), pages 39-61, August.
    12. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
    13. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj & Sengupta, Kunal & Vohra, Rajiv, 1989. "A consistent bargaining set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 93-112, October.
    14. Bennett, Elaine & Zame, William R, 1988. "Bargaining in Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 17(4), pages 279-300.
    15. Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo, 1986. "Strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 101-117, February.
    16. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
    17. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1980. "Stability of decision systems under majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 150-159, October.
    18. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
    19. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
    20. Martin, Mathieu & Merlin, Vincent, 2002. "The stability set as a social choice correspondence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 91-113, September.
    21. Greenberg, J. & Weber, S., 1991. "Stable Coalition Structures with Unidimensional Set of Alternatives," Papers 9133, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    22. Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Credible Coalitions and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(2), pages 185-187.
    23. Zhou Lin, 1994. "A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 512-526, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Dynamic Farsighted Stability," Discussion Papers 22, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    2. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2010. "Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 1(3), pages 1-13, September.
    3. Iñarra García, María Elena & Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción & Molis Bañales, Elena, 2007. "The Stability of the Roommate Problem Revisited," IKERLANAK 2007-30, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    4. Mikhail Safronov, 2016. "A Coasian Approach to Efficient Mechanism Design," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1619, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    5. Diamantoudi, Effrosyni & Xue, Licun, 2007. "Coalitions, agreements and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 105-125, September.
    6. Demange, Gabrielle, 2009. "The strategy structure of some coalition formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 83-104, January.
    7. Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2007. "A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 85-90, April.
    8. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2011. "Bargaining cum voice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(2), pages 199-225, February.
    9. Guillaume Haeringer, 2000. "Stable Coalition Structures with Fixed Decision Schme," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 471.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    10. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2006. "Voice and Bargaining Power," CESifo Working Paper Series 1668, CESifo Group Munich.
    11. Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2009. "Strategy-proof coalition formation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 431-452, November.
    12. Guillaume Haeringer, 2000. "Stable Coalition Structures with Common Decision Scheme," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1077, Econometric Society.
    13. Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez, 2004. "On the Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Coalition Formation Rules," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(10), pages 1-8.
    14. Vartiainen, Hannu, 2011. "Dynamic coalitional equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 672-698, March.
    15. Papai, Szilvia, 2004. "Unique stability in simple coalition formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 337-354, August.
    16. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2004:i:10:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Iehle, Vincent, 2007. "The core-partition of a hedonic game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 176-185, September.
    18. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.

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