On coalition formation: durable coalition structures
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mathieu Martin & Vincent Merlin, 2002.
"The stability set as a social choice correspondence,"
- Martin, Mathieu & Merlin, Vincent, 2002. "The stability set as a social choice correspondence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 91-113, September.
- Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi & Tayfun Sonmez, 1999.
"Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
449, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Guesnerie, Roger & Oddou, Claude, 1981.
"Second best taxation as a game,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 67-91, August.
- Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
- José Alcalde & Pablo Revilla, 2001. "Tops Responsiveness, Strategy-Proofness And Coalition Formation Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-11, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
- Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, .
"Farsighted Stability in Hedonic Games,"
Economics Working Papers
2000-12, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
- Anke Gerber, 2000. "original papers : Coalition formation in general NTU games," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 149-175.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Masso, Jordi, 1997.
"Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 464-475, August.
- Dutta, B. & Masso, J., 1996. "Stability of Matchings when Individuals Have Preferences Over Colleagues," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 325.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Bennett, Elaine & Zame, William R, 1988. "Bargaining in Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 279-300.
- Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
- Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo, 1986. "Strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 101-117, February.
- Greenberg, J. & Weber, S., 1991.
"Stable Coalition Structures with Unidimensional Set of Alternatives,"
9133, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Greenberg Joseph & Weber Shlomo, 1993. "Stable Coalition Structures with a Unidimensional Set of Alternatives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 62-82, June.
- Greenberg, J. & Weber, S., 1991. "Stable Coalition Structure with Unidimensional Set of Alternatives," Papers 91-11, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1980. "Stability of decision systems under majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 150-159, October.
- Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Credible Coalitions and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 185-87.
- Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993.
"Equilibrium Binding Agreements,"
21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Demange, G., 1991.
"Intermediate Preferences and Stable Coalition Structures,"
DELTA Working Papers
91-16, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Demange, Gabrielle, 1994. "Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 45-58, January.
- Gabrielle Demange, 1994. "Intermediate Preferences and Stable Coalition Structures," Post-Print halshs-00670920, HAL.
- Zhou Lin, 1994. "A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 512-526, May.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj & Sengupta, Kunal & Vohra, Rajiv, 1989. "A consistent bargaining set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 93-112, October.
- Bhattacharya, Anindya, 2002. "Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 27-44, January.
- Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
- Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:45:y:2003:i:2:p:185-203. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.