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A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games


  • Salvador Barberà
  • Anke Gerber


In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be ìresting pointsî for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.

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  • Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2005. "A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games," Working Papers 248, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:248

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, 2003. "Farsighted stability in hedonic games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(1), pages 39-61, August.
    2. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
    3. Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2003. "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 185-203, April.
    4. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
    5. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2011. "Bargaining cum voice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(2), pages 199-225, February.
    2. Tania Singer & Ernst Fehr, 2005. "The Neuroeconomics of Mind Reading and Empathy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 340-345, May.
    3. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Dynamic Farsighted Stability," Discussion Papers 22, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    4. Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "Dynamic stable set," Discussion Papers 33, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    5. Eric Weese, 2015. "Political mergers as coalition formation: An analysis of the Heisei municipal amalgamations," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), pages 257-307, July.
    6. Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "One-deviation principle in coalition formation," Discussion Papers 35, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    7. Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Christian Zehnder, "undated". "The Behavioral Effects of Minimum Wages," IEW - Working Papers 247, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    8. Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs & Kosfeld, Michael, 2005. "Neuroeconomic Foundations of Trust and Social Preferences," IZA Discussion Papers 1641, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    9. Casajus, André, 2008. "On the stability of coalition structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 271-274, August.
    10. Weese, Eric, 2008. "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation : Evidence from Japanese Municipal Amalgamations," CCES Discussion Paper Series 5, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    11. Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2009. "Strategy-proof coalition formation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 431-452, November.
    12. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    13. Vartiainen, Hannu, 2011. "Dynamic coalitional equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 672-698, March.
    14. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2013. "Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2013-1, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    15. Eric Weese, 2011. "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation," Working Papers 997, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.

    More about this item


    Hedonic Game; Coalition formation; stability;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games


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