On the stability of coalition structures
We resolve a seeming conflict between a non-existence result on solutions to coalition formation in hedonic games [Barbera, S., Gerber, A., 2007. A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games. Economics Letters 95, 85-90] and the universal existence of stable coalition structures in TU games under the [chi]-value [Casajus, A., 2008. Outside options, component efficiency, and stability, Games and Economic Behavior (forthcoming). doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.04.003].
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- Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2005.
"A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
656.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2007. "A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 85-90, April.
- Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2005. "A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games," Working Papers 248, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, . "A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games," IEW - Working Papers 238, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Harald Wiese, 2007. "Measuring The Power Of Parties Within Government Coalitions," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(02), pages 307-322.
- Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
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