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On the stability of coalition structures

  • Casajus, André
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    We resolve a seeming conflict between a non-existence result on solutions to coalition formation in hedonic games [Barbera, S., Gerber, A., 2007. A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games. Economics Letters 95, 85-90] and the universal existence of stable coalition structures in TU games under the [chi]-value [Casajus, A., 2008. Outside options, component efficiency, and stability, Games and Economic Behavior (forthcoming). doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.04.003].

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-4RV7Y7S-4/1/40c3bcafd8d7b3108ed2aba87756fadc
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

    Volume (Year): 100 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 2 (August)
    Pages: 271-274

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:2:p:271-274
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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    1. Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2005. "A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 656.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    2. Harald Wiese, 2007. "Measuring The Power Of Parties Within Government Coalitions," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(02), pages 307-322.
    3. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
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