IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-05111793.html

The permission-Owen value: axiomatization and application to liability situations

Author

Listed:
  • Takaaki Abe

    (Kyushu University)

  • David Lowing

    (CentraleSupélec, LGI - Laboratoire Génie Industriel - CentraleSupélec - Université Paris-Saclay)

  • Satoshi Nakada

    (Tokyo University of Science [Tokyo])

  • Kevin Techer

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

Abstract

This paper introduces a novel framework for transferable utility games that incorporates permission relationships between a priori unions of players. This framework is particularly well-suited for modeling liability situations where groups of individuals cause harm through a series of wrongful actions. We propose the permission-Owen value, a new allocation rule that merges the (conjunctive) permission value with the Owen value, and apply it to these liability situations. Finally, we provide several axiomatic characterizations of the permission-Owen value, grounded in principles of marginality and fairness.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Takaaki Abe & David Lowing & Satoshi Nakada & Kevin Techer, 2025. "The permission-Owen value: axiomatization and application to liability situations," Post-Print hal-05111793, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05111793
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00946-2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05111793. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.