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Graphs and Cooperation in Games

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  • Roger B. Myerson

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  • Roger B. Myerson, 1976. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Discussion Papers 246, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:246
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. AUMANN, Robert J. & DREZE, Jacques H., 1974. "Cooperative games with coalition structures," LIDAM Reprints CORE 217, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rodrigo J. Harrison & Roberto Munoz, 2003. "Stability and Equilibrium Selection in a Link Formation Game," Game Theory and Information 0306004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Guillaume Haeringer, 2000. "On the Stability of Cooperation Structures," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 472.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    3. KIRMAN, Alan, 1980. "Imperfect communication in markets – a big world problem.," Institut des Mathématiques Economiques – Document de travail de l’I.M.E. (1974-1993) 44, Institut des Mathématiques Economiques. LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
    4. Rod Garratt & James E. Parco & Cheng-Zhong Qin & Amnon Rapoport, 2005. "Potential Maximization And Coalition Government Formation," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(04), pages 407-429.
    5. Goyal, Sanjeev & Joshi, Sumit, 2003. "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-85, April.
    6. Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2005. "Strongly stable networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 420-444, May.
    7. Rachel E. Kranton & Deborah F. Minehart, 2001. "A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 485-508, June.
    8. Zissimos, Ben, "undated". "Why Are Trade Agreements Regional? A Theory based on Noncooperative Networks," Economic Research Papers 269465, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    9. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ghosal, Sayantan & Ray, Debraj, 2005. "Farsighted network formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 143-164, June.
    10. Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks," Microeconomics 0211011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Hans Haller & Sudipta Sarangi, 2003. "Nash Networks with Heterogeneous Agents," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 337, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    12. Sergio Currarini, 2003. "On the Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Externalities," Working Papers 2003.19, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    13. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Negotiating the membership," Game Theory and Information 0409003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "A survey of models of network formation: Stability and efficiency," Working Papers 1161, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    15. Anna Khmelnitskaya, 2010. "Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 657-669, October.
    16. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2012. "Weighted component fairness for forest games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 144-151.
    17. Jackson, Matthew O., 2005. "Allocation rules for network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 128-154, April.
    18. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2003. "Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
    19. Mutuswami, Suresh & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 242-264, October.
    20. Suresh Mutuswami & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus: Realizing Efficient Outcomes in General Economic Environments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 479.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    21. Navarro, Noemí & Perea, Andrés, 2001. "Bargaining in networks and the myerson value," UC3M Working papers. Economics we016121, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    22. Jinpeng Ma, 1998. "Strategic Formation of Coalitions," Discussion Papers 1225, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    23. Francis Bloch & Matt Jackson, 2004. "The Formation of Networks with Side Payments," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 198, Econometric Society.

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